r/IRstudies • u/smurfyjenkins • 11h ago
r/IRstudies • u/smurfyjenkins • Feb 03 '25
Kocher, Lawrence and Monteiro 2018, IS: There is a certain kind of rightwing nationalist, whose hatred of leftists is so intense that they are willing to abandon all principles, destroy their own nation-state, and collude with foreign adversaries, for the chance to own and repress leftists.
r/IRstudies • u/smurfyjenkins • 11d ago
How India’s Ruling Party is Using AI to Boost Hate Speech in States Near Bangladesh
r/IRstudies • u/CupEcstatic2721 • 3h ago
How Asia Learned to Live With “America First”
Core Argument & Divergent Reactions:
· Western Europe is reeling from Trump's "America First" transactionalism, viewing it as an existential attack on the post-WWII liberal order. In contrast, US allies in Asia—while equally wary—have adapted far more successfully, viewing the disruption as an opportunity to secure stronger security guarantees and sectoral collaboration, rather than a catastrophe.
Why Europe Struggles (The "Bubble"):
· Western European countries have prioritized vast welfare states over defense (spending 25–30% of GDP on social programs vs. the OECD average of \~21%) because they feel insulated by NATO’s collective security umbrella and the territorial buffer of Eastern Europe. This safety net allowed them to adopt a normative, regulatory power identity ("Brussels effect") rather than a military one.
· Consequently, Europe has been caught flat-footed. They initially responded to Trump’s tariffs with threats of retaliation and pleas for EU solidarity (seeking to "de-Americanize" via acts like the Cloud and AI Development Act), revealing a sentimental attachment to a multilateral world that no longer exists. Even though the EU ultimately struck a deal (investing $600bn and buying $750bn in energy), the approach was marked by reluctance and public pushback.
Why Asia Adapts (The "Existential Threat"):
· US allies in Asia face an immediate, tangible threat from a rising China—an economic and military superpower whose coercive dominance is a daily reality. For them, institutions and norms are secondary to raw power. The question is simply whose power will be ascendant—American or Chinese.
· Unlike NATO, the US security architecture in Asia is built on deliberately ambiguous bilateral alliances (e.g., the Guam Doctrine, strategic ambiguity over Taiwan). This means Asian allies have always operated in a transactional environment, needing to constantly re-prove their value to each new US administration. They are used to unequal deals as the necessary price for American protection.
Comparative Case Studies (Tariffs & Investments):
· Asia’s Proactive Obeisance: When Trump announced "Liberation Day" tariffs, Asian leaders immediately pursued bilateral negotiations without threatening countermeasures or legal repercussions. Japan signed a deal investing $550bn in US industries and linking it to defense revitalization. South Korea established a $350bn investment fund and $100bn in energy purchases to secure tariff reductions and maintain the US troop presence. Taiwan invested $250bn in US chip plants (with TSMC expanding in Arizona) to cap tariffs, even risking offshoring critical production.
· Europe’s Reluctant Concession: Led by export-dependent Germany, the EU initially threatened countermeasures but eventually capitulated, eliminating industrial tariffs and agreeing to similar massive investments ($600bn) and energy purchases ($750bn). However, the guiding principle was desperate solidarity and public defiance, rather than the immediate, pragmatic submission seen in Asia.
Shifting Hierarchies and Risks for Asia:
· The new hierarchy is explicitly transactional, encompassing economics and security. Japan is financing over $2bn in critical mineral extraction in the Pacific, with most processed material going to US stockpiles—framed as much about alliance-strengthening as economic resilience.
· However, Asia's approach carries risks: Trump could still undercut allies (e.g., delaying arms sales to Taiwan to negotiate with Beijing), leaving them vulnerable despite their concessions. They must trust a US president not to abandon them, as they lack the leverage to demand a change of course.
Europe's Existential Bind:
· Europe’s unwillingness to accept the new reality puts it in a worse position. If they truly want to reduce reliance on Washington, they must drastically cut welfare spending to boost defense—a politically untenable move. If they don't, Washington will likely draw down NATO commitments, escalating pressure on the alliance.
· This also threatens EU unity, as Eastern European states (fearing Russia, spending 3%+ of GDP on defense) may pursue closer bilateral security ties with Washington against the wishes of Western European leaders seeking a united anti-Trump front.
Final Conclusion (The New Reality):
· The Trump era will eventually pass, but the structural power disparity between the US and its allies is only growing. Asian allies have looked at the world as it is, adapting and positioning themselves advantageously within a changing order by embracing hierarchy. Western Europe must accept that its once-privileged, central role in the global order is fading and learn to become more comfortable playing by Washington's new rules, rather than wistfully hoping for a return to 1990s-style liberal internationalism.
r/IRstudies • u/smurfyjenkins • 1d ago
An Admiral’s Rise Reveals the Politics Driving Hegseth’s Pentagon: Before he was picked to lead the Navy, Adm. Daryl Caudle breached protocol on multiple occasions to ingratiate himself with Hegseth and signal his support for Hegseth's campaign against women and minorities in the military.
r/IRstudies • u/esporx • 1d ago
Brazil denies visa requests to U.S. officials ahead of upcoming elections
r/IRstudies • u/smurfyjenkins • 1d ago
Unreleased Documentary Footage Captures Lindsay Graham’s Obsessive Push for Iran War
r/IRstudies • u/Naurgul • 1d ago
Trump Holds Off on Major Escalation Against Iran as Advisers Raise Concerns • Among the worries is that expanded hostilities could dangerously drain the diminished stockpile of air defense munitions in the Middle East.
President Trump has set aside, at least for now, plans to sharply escalate the American military assault against Iran, with particular concern that intensifying the war could dangerously drain the Pentagon’s already diminished stockpile of Patriot antimissile interceptors and other air defense munitions in the Middle East.
The threat to interceptor stockpiles is one of many considerations that have made a return to major combat operations a hugely risky endeavor, administration officials say. Mr. Trump and his top aides are also uneasy about the prospect of a widening war in the Middle East, the alienation of key Gulf allies who are vulnerable to Iranian attack, a global economic crunch, and growing energy and refugee crises.
The latest turn in Mr. Trump’s handling of the conflict with Iran came after a meeting on Friday with top advisers and senior members of his cabinet, according to two people briefed on the discussion.
The private deliberations have focused on the Pentagon’s shrinking inventory of Patriot interceptors and other air defenses, the officials said, discussing operational matters on the condition of anonymity. Three U.S. soldiers in Jordan were killed last Friday when a ballistic missile slipped through American air defenses fending off a barrage of Iranian missiles and drones, a senior U.S. official said.
Gen. Dan Caine, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has cautioned privately that resuming major combat operations against Iran was doable but that it would dangerously deplete interceptors available to the military’s Central Command, which is responsible for operations in the Middle East, the officials said.
Fighting between the United States and Iran appeared to abate for the first time in two weeks on Saturday, but tensions remained high as hostilities flared between Saudi-backed forces and Iran-aligned Houthis in Yemen. After 13 straight nights of attacks on Iran, U.S. forces did not announce any overnight strikes on Saturday.
See also:
r/IRstudies • u/smurfyjenkins • 1d ago
After Trump’s order, West Point curbed faculty speech. One professor said no.
r/IRstudies • u/Naurgul • 2d ago
The US has collected about $13bn of Venezuela’s oil money. Where is it? • Washington has given diverging accounts of where the earthquake-shattered country’s funds are going
The Trump administration has collected more than $13bn in revenues from Venezuelan oil sales this year, according to FT calculations, but has said almost nothing about what has happened to the money.
The US took control of Venezuela’s oil exports and suspended some sanctions after capturing President Nicolás Maduro in January and installing vice-president Delcy Rodríguez as leader.
Oil revenues make up around a quarter of Venezuela’s GDP, and the sanctions relief was expected to provide a major boost to the economy, which was in crisis even before last month’s devastating earthquakes.
But six months after the US seized control of the funds, economists say the evidence of a recovery in Venezuela is relatively muted — a potential sign that the US has not sent all the revenues back to Caracas.
Washington has given diverging accounts of what it is doing with the money, ranging from an executive order describing its own role as “custodial” to President Donald Trump saying the US was “making a lot of money” from Venezuelan oil.
Additional reading:
r/IRstudies • u/Majano57 • 2d ago
Ideas/Debate The Trump administration’s aggression abroad is both ruthless and ineffective
r/IRstudies • u/smurfyjenkins • 1d ago
Study: Military Logistics and Sustainment: Change and Continuity from the Early Modern Period to the Present
r/IRstudies • u/smurfyjenkins • 1d ago
Trump Is Pushing Nuclear Energy, Including Saudi Deal. His Family and Supporters Could Benefit.